AI coding assistant hallucinations are confident but false outputs, such as invented package names, unsafe authentication advice, or overly broad cloud...
AI coding assistant hallucinations are confident but false outputs, such as invented package names, unsafe authentication advice, or overly broad cloud permissions. They matter because generated code can pass a quick review and still create a supply-chain or security flaw. Treat every suggestion as untrusted until a registry, test, or expert check confirms it.
Key Takeaways- A plausible package name is not proof that the package exists or is safe.
- A successful build checks syntax and compatibility, not security or truth.
- Verify dependencies against official registries, review lockfiles, and use isolated builds.
- Ask a qualified person to review generated security logic before deployment.
I’m Ermenildo Castro, a Filipino software engineer in Seattle, and I’ve spent years watching teams trade careful checks for the comfort of code that looks finished. In work at large technology companies, I learned that a clean diff can hide a poor assumption just as easily as a messy one. AI makes that old engineering problem arrive faster.
The danger is not that a model always writes nonsense. It usually does not. The danger is that correct and incorrect suggestions can look almost identical, and a busy engineer may have no obvious warning to follow. A few basic checks can make AI useful without handing it the keys to your build system.
What Are AI Coding Assistant Hallucinations?
An AI coding assistant hallucination is output that sounds credible but is false, unsupported, or unsafe. A model might invent a library, claim that an API accepts a parameter it does not accept, or explain a security choice using facts that no longer apply. The term describes a failure in the answer, not a human-like act of lying. The model predicts likely text from patterns; it does not automatically know whether every sentence matches a current package registry or security standard.
That difference matters. A person who does not know an answer may pause, check a manual, or say so. A language model can fill the gap with a neat-looking guess. Its fluency hides uncertainty. Code makes the problem harder because names and signatures often follow familiar patterns. An invented Python module may look like a real one, and a fabricated method may fit neatly beside legitimate calls.
I have seen the same review trap in ordinary engineering work: a change looks tidy, tests pass, and people infer that the design must be sound. That inference is too generous. Compilation proves that code meets certain syntax and build rules; it does not prove a dependency exists in the intended registry, that an authentication flow resists phishing, or that a cloud role grants only necessary access.
A published analysis of 16 code-generating models reported that roughly one in five suggested dependencies in its tests referred to packages that did not exist, with more than 205,000 unique fabricated names across the test set. Those numbers describe the researchers’ tests, not every model, prompt, or development team. Still, they show why package verification deserves a place in the build process. See the study, We Have a Package for You!, for its analysis of package hallucinations.
The risk is not limited to dependencies. Generated answers can suggest old cryptography, incomplete input checks, weak session handling, or cloud permissions that exceed the task. A model can also cite a real document while drawing the wrong conclusion from it. Check the artifact and the reasoning. Neither confidence nor polished formatting is evidence.
Why Catching These Errors Matters
The first reason is direct: a fabricated dependency can become a supply-chain opening. If an attacker registers a package name that an assistant repeatedly invents, an engineer may install software controlled by the attacker. Depending on the package ecosystem and installation path, code can run during a build, import, or later application use. The attacker may then reach build secrets, source code, or deployment credentials if the environment gives the package that access.
Researchers have called this pattern slopsquatting. Traditional typosquatting depends on someone mistyping a known package name. Slopsquatting targets a name produced by a model, so the developer may have made no typo at all. The cited study found that some fabricated names recurred across prompts and models in its tests. Repetition gives an attacker a target worth watching, though it does not mean every invented name will be registered or exploited.
The second reason is that security advice ages. A model may produce an authentication pattern that was common years ago but no longer fits a high-risk account. SMS one-time codes, for example, can be exposed to phishing and phone-number takeover. They are not equally risky in every setting, and replacing them is not as simple as flipping a switch, but a model should not present them as a strong answer for every account. For accounts that need phishing-resistant sign-in, passkeys are worth evaluating. The FIDO Alliance passkeys overview explains how passkeys work and why they resist many common phishing attacks.
The third reason is human cost. A bad access policy or a broken recovery flow can expose customer information and force real people to spend days recovering from a preventable mistake. In my experience, the strongest teams ask who bears the cost if an assumption fails. That question is not abstract ethics; it helps engineers choose safer defaults and keep work worthy of the trust placed in them.
There is also a practical cost: debugging time. A developer can lose an afternoon chasing an imaginary library or a method that never existed. A small registry check at the start is cheaper than untangling a build failure late in a release. Frankly, a confident answer is not a shortcut if the team must later prove every piece of it from scratch.
A Step-by-Step Guide to Safer AI-Assisted Coding
- Define the task and its limits. Ask for a narrow change, name the language and framework versions, and say what the code must not do. For example, request a small input-validation helper rather than a complete account system. Give the assistant approved libraries when you have them. A bounded request leaves less room for invented architecture and makes review easier.
- Check every suggested dependency before installing it. Search the official package registry for the exact name, publisher, version history, and project links. Confirm that the package serves the stated purpose and is not a look-alike. For npm, PyPI, or another registry, search the registry itself rather than trusting a model’s prose or an unexplained command. If the package is absent, stop. Do not register or install a name just because the assistant insists it is standard.
- Inspect the package before it gets broad access. A real package can still be malicious, abandoned, or unsuitable. Review its maintainers, release activity, dependency tree, license, and installation behavior. Use your organization’s approved scanners and policy checks. Pin versions and commit the lockfile so that later builds resolve the same dependency set. A lockfile improves repeatability; it does not certify that the first version was safe.
- Run builds in a controlled environment. Give CI only the secrets and permissions required for its job. Keep untrusted pull-request builds away from production credentials, and use an isolated container or runner when practical. Monitor network access and build steps. If a package attempts an unexpected action, the system should make that visible instead of quietly granting it broad access.
- Verify security logic against trusted guidance. For authentication, encryption, authorization, and cloud roles, compare the suggestion with current standards, official vendor documentation, and established libraries. Prefer well-maintained cryptographic libraries over hand-written algorithms. For sign-in, decide what phishing resistance, recovery, and accessibility mean for the service rather than accepting whichever flow appears in generated code.
- Review permissions and failure paths. Ask what happens when input is missing, a token expires, a service times out, or a user loses a device. Check that cloud roles do not grant broad actions without a clear need. A policy that works in the happy path can still expose data in an error path. The NIST Secure Software Development Framework provides practices teams can use to improve development and review processes.
- Test claims, not just code. Unit tests can check expected behavior, but they only cover cases someone thought to write. Add dependency checks, static analysis, secret scanning, integration tests, and security tests suited to the change. Verify that imported names resolve from approved sources. A green test run is useful evidence, not a permission slip to skip review.
- Keep a human accountable for consequential changes. Assign a reviewer who understands the feature, not merely someone who can approve a pull request. Ask them to inspect the dependency choice, security assumptions, and rollback plan. In teams I have worked with, a short, informed review caught issues that a long list of generic checklist boxes did not. People remain responsible for code shipped under their name, whether a person or a model drafted it.
Retrieval-augmented generation can add another useful check. It lets a system pull answers from approved documentation or internal references instead of relying only on patterns learned during training. That can ground an answer in material you control, but it does not guarantee correctness: retrieved pages may be old, the model may misread them, and citations may not support the claim. Treat retrieval as a better source trail, not an automatic security review.
Slopsquatting vs. Traditional Typosquatting
The closest comparison is traditional typosquatting: both attacks exploit developers installing a package whose name they have not checked carefully. The key difference is where the risky name comes from. In a typo attack, the developer makes a typing or recall error. In slopsquatting, an AI assistant may produce a name that looks legitimate but was fabricated.
| Feature | AI package hallucination and slopsquatting | Traditional typosquatting |
|---|
| How the name appears | An assistant generates a plausible but nonexistent package name. | A developer mistypes or misremembers a real package name. |
| Attacker’s opportunity | Register a name that assistants may repeat. | Register a name close to a popular package. |
| Human warning sign | The name looks plausible and may arrive with confident explanation. | The spelling may look close to a familiar package. |
| Useful first check | Verify the exact name and publisher in the official registry. | Compare the exact name with the intended package and publisher. |
| Defense that helps | Approved dependency lists, registry checks, lockfile review, and isolated builds. | Exact-name review, dependency policy, lockfile review, and isolated builds. |
Neither method guarantees an attack. A fabricated name may never be registered, and a misspelled package may be harmless or unavailable. The risk grows when a team accepts a name without checking who owns it or what code it contains. The same controls address both cases because both depend on trust arriving before verification.
This is why package allowlists can help in sensitive systems, though they need maintenance and a clear process for adding legitimate tools. Registry checks catch a nonexistent package early; reputation and code review help assess a real one. A pinned lockfile makes builds repeatable, but an attacker’s package can also be pinned. Here is the kicker: consistency is not the same as trustworthiness.
Organizations can track their own exposure instead of relying on guesswork. Record which generated dependencies reviewers reject, why they reject them, and whether the same names recur. Avoid treating a small test as a universal rate for all AI tools. The NIST AI Risk Management Framework offers a broader way to identify, assess, and manage risks from AI systems, including risks that need ongoing measurement.
Common Mistakes to Avoid
Mistake 1: Treating a clean build as proof of safety. A build can succeed with a real but unsafe package, an overly broad cloud policy, or an outdated authentication flow. It answers a limited question: can these inputs produce a build under these conditions? It does not answer whether the result is safe to deploy. I have watched smart engineers confuse it runs with it is right. Keep those checks separate.
Mistake 2: Trusting package names that look familiar. Attackers use naming conventions because people and tools recognize them quickly. A package can have a convincing name, a polished description, and a version number that looks ordinary. Check the registry owner and the package’s history. Do not assume a likely name belongs to the maintainer you intended.
Mistake 3: Copying a whole security design from one prompt. Authentication and authorization depend on account risk, recovery needs, user devices, and system boundaries. A short answer may skip those conditions. Ask for options and trade-offs, then compare them with current guidance and your threat model. If the assistant recommends SMS codes, a cipher, or a broad IAM role, ask what evidence supports the choice and what safer alternatives fit the actual system.
Mistake 4: Believing retrieval or citations remove the need to review. A link can point to an official page while the explanation misstates it. Documentation can also change after a model or retrieval index was updated. Open the cited source, find the exact passage, and check its date and scope. The OWASP guidance on LLM misinformation discusses the risk of false or misleading output and the need to check consequential claims.
Mistake 5: Giving an AI agent more access than its task needs. If an assistant can run shell commands, modify files, or access secrets, a bad suggestion can do more than waste time. Start with the smallest permission set, review commands before execution, and keep credentials out of prompts and test environments. More autonomy means stronger containment, not less scrutiny.
Mistake 6: Turning the checklist into a box-ticking ritual. A reviewer who clicks through generic warnings without understanding the change has not meaningfully reduced risk. Checks need owners, clear failure actions, and enough context to judge the result. Build a path for exceptions, too; otherwise, people may work around the process. Security controls should help responsible work, not bury it under noise.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is an AI coding assistant hallucination?
It is code or an explanation generated by an AI system that appears credible but contains false or unsupported claims. Examples include a package that does not exist, a made-up API method, or a security recommendation that is outdated. The answer may still look polished and may even compile. Check important claims against official registries, current documentation, tests, and knowledgeable review.
What is slopsquatting?
Slopsquatting is a supply-chain attack idea in which someone registers package names that AI coding tools tend to invent. A developer may then install the attacker-controlled package after an assistant recommends the fabricated name. The risk depends on whether the name is registered and whether someone installs it; checking exact package names and publishers is a straightforward defense.
Can AI-generated code be safe to use?
Yes, if teams treat it like code from an unfamiliar contributor: review it, test it, check dependencies, and limit its permissions. AI can help draft routine code or explain unfamiliar APIs, but it cannot take responsibility for production decisions. The amount of scrutiny should rise when code touches authentication, encryption, personal data, payments, or deployment credentials.
How can a team reduce hallucinated dependencies?
Use approved package sources, verify every name in its official registry, pin reviewed versions, and inspect lockfile changes. Add automated checks for unknown imports and dependency-policy violations. Keep builds isolated and avoid exposing secrets to unreviewed code. Track rejected suggestions so the team can see repeated problems and improve its controls over time.
AI coding tools are useful assistants, not authorities. Let them save time on drafts, boilerplate, and explanations, then spend that saved time checking the parts that can harm users or expose a system. I learned in large engineering organizations that small, repeatable safeguards beat confident guesses and heroic late-night fixes. Stewardship applies to code, too: the people who build and ship it should care for the trust, time, and data placed in their hands.